Introduction
Why has the theory of judgement and proposition been central for the transition from British idealism to early analytic philosophy? In order to be able to answer this question, one has to know more about the theory of judgement in British idealism and the nineteenth century in general. Early analytic philosophy, that is, before 1905, consists of at least these aspects: logical realism, an atomistic theory of wholes and parts and a new method of analysis. I will focus here on logical realism as it is defended by Moore and Russell. Leaving the theory of wholes and parts and the new method for the next chapter, the central question here is: How did a new, British variant of logical realism, that is, a new theory of judgement and proposition, emerge from British idealism?
Logical realism is the position that propositions and their parts, generally understood as concepts, or, in the case of Gottlob Frege, as senses, have some form of being independently of the mind that thinks them. This form of being is different both from the way that tables and trees are, and from the way that particular acts of thinking are. Propositions and concepts are taken to be outside space and time, and they do not change when someone thinks of them. We may distinguish three important representatives of logical realism in the early nineteenth century: J.F. Herbart (1776-1841), a psychologist and philosopher; Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), who got Herbart's chair in Göttingen in 1844, and was primarily a philosopher, but one with a keen interest in science, including psychology; and Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848), whose aim was to provide an objective foundation for science in general. Herbart and Lotze are of special interest, because their logical realism is motivated by their interest in psychology. The emergence of psychology as a science makes it necessary to distinguish between logical and philosophical questions, on the one hand, and psychological questions, on the other hand.
There are three different ways to categorise philosophers who defend a variant of logical realism.
I. Although all logical realists in the nineteenth century have in common that they aim to guarantee the objectivity of truth by acknowledging an objective bearer of truth, and that they defend some form of anti-psychologism, each variant has different aims besides.
1
Whereas Lotze and the Neo-Kantians introduce a realm of objective value (Geltung), or truth, in order to guarantee the objectivity of science and knowledge, Bolzano and Frege introduce a realm of both true and false propositions. Bolzano and Frege are thus able to account not only for the objectivity of knowledge but also for the objectivity of logic, semantics and thought in general. In Lotze's variant of logical realism, the notion of value or validity plays a central role. In the first book of his Logic he uses value and truth synonymously, and uses non-validity in the sense of falsity.
2 In the third book of his Logic, called On Knowledge (Vom Erkennen), Lotze introduces the idea that the logical thought, in contradiction to the act of thinking (Lotze 1874, § 345), has objective validity (Lotze uses here the Kantian term objective Gültigkeit). Besides the value of truth there is the validity of meaning. Although objective validity seems thus to be a broader notion than validity as truth, Lotze's primary aim is to guarantee the objectivity of the bearers of truth.
3 The way the two meanings of validity are related will be explained under II below. A Neo-Kantian like W. Windelband, who adopts Lotze's notion of validity, acknowledges a realm of validity, by which he means the validity of truth (die Geltung der Wahrheit, Windelband 1914, 212) . Just as for Lotze, validity for Windelband has both a broader and a more specific meaning. Their form of logical realism involves the thesis that both concepts and truths are independent of empirical acts of thinking and judging. With respect to the notion of validity, Windelband says that one has to distinguish the psychological from the logical meaning of the word. He has only the validity of truth in mind when he asserts that the sense of truth is in need of a validity as such without relation to an empirical consciousness. 4 On the Neo-Kantian account, there is apparently no need for objective falsehood. Falsehoods do not have an objective value; they are due to subjective conditions. It is possible to be a logical realist as far as knowledge and truth are concerned, and to give a psychologistic account of error and falsehood at the same time. I come back to this point in Chapter 3. Bolzano and Frege understand
